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Remnants and Revenants: 
Politics and Violence in the work of Agamben and Derrida 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 Giorgio Agamben's idea of the remnant is one answer to the question what a non-
statal and non-juridical politics of human life might mean - a politics beyond the violence 
of law, sovereignty, representation.  The remnant (quel che resta), or that which remains, is 
disruptive and destabilising of established present states of affairs and processes.  It offers 
an elusive possibility of escape from the violence of the modern state.  Jacques Derrida's 
idea of the revenant - the ghost or specter which comes back, destabilising any settled idea 
of the 'present' - promises a future which is open.  Despite this possible open future, we  
cannot go beyond violence.  We can engage in a contaminated, spectral politics of lesser 
violence.   
 In this paper we analyse the implications of these contrasting responses to the 
question of political possibility.  Our major background concern is the significant question: 
can there be politics without violence? This key question, in our understanding of 
contemporary political theory, is more often evaded than posed or answered.1  Among 
contributors to political thought Derrida and Agamben are two for whom the problem of a 
possible politics without violence is avowedly central.  For both, reading Walter 
Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence' is the occasion for focus on the relationship between 
violence and politics, including future politics.  We argue that Derrida poses and responds 
to the question of the meaning and relation of politics and violence more persuasively than 
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does Agamben. We also argue, however, that Derrida’s argument is flawed by  abstracton 
and formalism.  In the end, neither thinker provides us with the resources to think 
politically about the future politics that is promised in their work.  
 
2. Walter Benjamin: Critique, Violence and Time  
 Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ was first published in 1921.2  In engaging in a 
‘critique’ of violence, Benjamin’s aim is to establish grounds on which to discriminate 
between different types or meanings of violence, and on which to evaluate violence as a 
political phenomenon. He rejects the possibility of using ‘ends’ (the purposes that violence 
may serve) as the standpoint for such critique, because this would not give 'a criterion for 
violence itself as a principle'.  He is interested in discriminating ‘within the sphere of 
means themselves’ (Benjamin 1978: 277).    
 Benjamin is clear that there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘deed’ that makes it into one 
of violence.  Nature or accident can involve physical violation.  Violence, however,  is a 
normative category.  Its normativity, furthermore, is intrinsically connected to the 
normativity of law.  He begins his critique by examining the contrast between natural and 
positive law. Theses of natural law, he argues, focus on the justifiability of ends as the key 
to the justifiability of violent means. (Benjamin 1978: 278)  Theses of positive law focus 
on the legality of  means.  This is what determines the legitimacy of the violence in 
question. (Benjamin 1978: 279-80).  Ultimately, Benjamin argues, both of these 
legitimations of violence amount to two sides of the same coin.  Whether law is conceived 
as natural or positive, violence must be either ‘law-making’ or ‘law-preserving’ if it is to 
claim validity.(Benjamin 1978: 287).  These two kinds of violence are mutually dependent.  
They are equally problematic insofar as law itself is problematic. (Benjamin 1978: 287).   
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 In particular, all law is bound up with violence.  A peacefully struck contract is 
premissed on a power of violent origin, and confers on both parties a right to some form of 
violence in the case that the agreement is broken. (Benjamin 1978: 288).   Institutions of 
punishment (285-6),  military power and law (283-5), social rights (such as the right to 
strike) (281-83), parliamentarianism (288-9),  police (286-7), (as well as contract), all 
embody an unhappy dialectic between law-making and law-preserving violences, one or 
the other of which will often be denied, both of which will be 'spectrally' (286, 287) 
present.   All private (non-state) uses of violence threaten existing law and thereby provoke 
law-preserving violence.   
 Non-violence is possible only in spheres beyond the sovereign state.  'Unalloyed 
means of agreement' are possible - visible in private relationships (289), the negotiations of 
diplomats in inter-state anarchy (292-3), and the agreement, in general, on which language 
rests.(289).  However, such mechanisms of conflict resolution have been increasingly 
squeezed out by the self-perpetuating tension and mutual dependence between law-making 
and law-preserving violence. Even linguistic meaning itself is now 'penetrated by legal 
violence in the penalty placed on fraud.' (289)  Because even 'unalloyed agreement' based 
on courtesy, sympathy, peacableness and trust are determined, in their objective 
manifestation, by law, non-violence can operate only indirectly, and only in relation to 
matters concerning objects - not to ‘the resolution of conflict between man and man’.(289) 
Accordingly, it becomes difficult to see how there could be change in the world constituted 
by law if ‘violence is totally excluded in principle’.(293)  
 In the latter part of the essay, Benjamin examines the possibility of a violence that 
is neither law-making nor law-preserving.  There might be a violence which,  although it 
might be the (justified or unjustified) means for an end, is not related to that end as its 
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means. (293)  This possibility is consistent with the obvious nature of violence not as 
means at all, but as manifestation - which can quite properly be subjected to criticism.(294)  
 Benjamin examines two possible categories of non-mediate violence.  First is 
mythical violence, which Benjamin identifies in Greek myths in which the gods are 
directly manifest to humans.(294) But it turns out that the immediacy here is deceptive.  
Mythic violence is essentially a form of power and is inextricably entwined with law-
making.  It therefore does not escape the ongoing dialectical relation between law-making 
and law-preserving violence.(295-6)  In contrast to the ‘perniciousness’ of mythical, 
Benjamin introduces divine violence. (297)  This is law destroying, boundary destroying, 
breaking the cycle of  law making and law preservation.(300)  Mythical violence is bound 
up with guilt and retribution, with 'mere life', and is bloody.  Divine violence is expiatory 
(not punishing), is involved with living (not mere life), it might annihilate but it does so 
without  bloodshed. (297-8)   
 Divine violence is attested to by religious tradition - Benjamin's references are 
biblical.(297)  But it is also manifested and sanctioned in everyday life, in the power to 
educate.  In its perfected form education is outside law.(297)  It may manifest in 'true war', 
or even in judgement, but we cannot in the event know this.  And we must not confuse it 
with war, or with punishment, (let alone with legislation).  Mythical violence will be 
recognisable to men; divine violence not,  'because the expiatory power of  [divine] 
violence is not visible to men.'(300).  The violence that stands wholly outside of the project 
of founding or preserving state power, but which also cannot be known for what it is from 
a human standpoint, is the promise of a different (unknowable and unspecifiable) kind of 
future (300). 
 Benjamin’s text can be interpreted in a variety of ways. For the purposes of this 
paper, two aspects are particularly significant. First is Benjamin’s view of modern state 
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power, which is connected with a distinction between law and justice.  Benjamin identifies 
the modern state with an ever-expanding sphere of law, which originates in and is 
perpetuated by violence. A range of social and political institutions embody a mutually 
contaminating mixture of lawmaking and law-preserving violence.  For example, the 
police's  presence is particularly destructive in democratic contexts where the sovereignty 
they embody and extend is amorphously located and unaccountable.(287). Benjamin’s 
essay focusses not just on direct violation of bodies, but also the ‘brutal encumbrance’ of 
ongoing surveillance and regulation of everyday life (287). The ever-increasing scope of 
law, rather than eliminating violence from political relations, embeds it ever more deeply. 
Because all attempts to change things that depend on the articulation of a new law simply 
perpetuate the same logic, and because violence is nevertheless needed to challenge law, 
any genuine progress rests on the possibility of a violence that is neither law-making nor 
law-preserving. Divine violence, by contrast,  is about justice, with no ongoing blackmail 
of threat, guilt and punishment. As violence it is ‘lethal’, but it does not set up or 
perpetuate a regime of violence. It  is 'miraculous', in the sense that it  cannot be accounted 
for in terms of either origins or ends, even if in retrospect it may be recognised as 
revolutionary in its effects.  Justice, as opposed to law, is identified by Benjamin with 
exemplary (pure and immediate) action that is inspiring but not legislating.[295]   
 Second, the distinction between law and justice is related to critique of any kind of 
justification for the use of violence that relies on the idea that the future, and hence an 
instrumental relation between the past and future, can be known.  Benjamin's critique of 
violence is simultaneously a critique of philosophies of history that legitimate violence in 
the name of a new order. Constitutional liberal polities dissimulate the law-making and 
law-preserving violence on which they rely; revolutionaries are caught in the same 
dialectic when they assume that they know the end of history and the mechanisms of 
 6
progress. The concept of divine violence is thus intimately related to the idea of 
revolutionary ‘messianic’ time in another of Benjamin's texts, Theses on the Philosophy of 
History (Benjamin 1999).3  Here he develops an explicit critique of the historicism of 
certain modes of revolutionary thought.   According to historicists, on Benjamin’s account, 
all violence experienced and challenged by actors in the past is understood as functionally 
necessary in relation to the forces carrying history forward. The effect of this, Benjamin 
argues, is to silence the voices of the oppressed and encourage complicity with oppressors, 
all, supposedly, in the service of progress. This kind of ‘victor’s history’ perpetuates rather 
than interrupts the conditions of oppression.(Theses VII, VIII).   Benjamin argues that 
revolutionary change depends not on the sacrifice of the past to the present, but on the 
capacity to break open victor’s history, to 'fight for the oppressed past'.(Thesis XVII)   This 
happens, he argues, in moments of messianic time.   
 'Messianic' here signals a particular relationship between past, present and future.  
Because present generations were expected on earth, there is an 'agreement' between past 
and present generations, and present generations have a weak messianic power to which 
the past has a claim. (Thesis II)  Historical continuity, in particular the historicist tendency 
to gloss over past suffering in the name of present progress, is radically disrupted by these  
claims.  There is a  parallel with divine violence which also radically disrupts social, legal 
and political continuity, and in particular the legal trade off of suffering for order, with the 
manifestation of law destroying violence. The claim of messianism on us is that we must 
achieve the right kind of historical consciousness. (Thesis VI).  We must also attend to the 
now (Jetztzeit) (Thesis XIV) not in relation to a smooth past, nor to an empty future, 'for 
every second is a strait gate through which the Messiah may enter'. (Thesis B)  The 
alternative order that follows on this dramatic moment, whether that which results from 
divine violence, or that discernable by the historical materialist who 'recognises the sign of 
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a Messianic cessation of happening' (Thesis XVII),  cannot be straightforwardly 
represented.  It is expressed and exemplified by reference to religious tradition.  
 
3. Giorgio Agamben: Politics Beyond Lawmaking and Law-Preserving Violence 
 The source for Agamben's idea of 'remnant' is Paul's Letter to the Romans from the 
Christian New Testament, a quote from which forms an epigram for Remnants of 
Auschwitz: 
Even so at this present time there is a remnant according to the election of grace ...  
And so all Israel shall be saved. (Romans ch 11 vv 5,26). 
 
The  remnant is important in light of the overwhelming power of state, church and law - all 
the forces that condemn rather than save.  To set against this, we have only the weak 
messianic power of our capacity to set word against law, the nonjuridical against the 
juridical. This is a power that is weak not because it is ineffective but because it is entirely 
non-cumulative, a ‘remnant of potentiality’.  The idea of the remnant is developed most 
fully in The Time that Remains (2005b fp 2000) which analyses Romans.4  It echoes 
equally messianic characterisations of moment of radical interruption of the dominant 
order in earlier works such as Infancy and History (1993).    
 Throughout Agamben's work Benjamin's themes and insights are a source and an 
inspiration. (eg Agamben 1993 fp 1978: 91, 102).  He engages directly and critically with 
the 'Critique of Violence' and 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' in Homo Sacer (1998 
fp 1995), and State of Exception (2005 fp 2003).  Agamben’s narrative of the reduction of 
all contemporary political life to the violence of the exception is indebted to Benjamin's 
thesis that 'the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule' 
(Benjamin 1999: Thesis VIII; see Agamben 1993: 102).  It can be interpreted as a 
development of Benjamin’s account of mythical (lawmaking) violence as ‘bloody power 
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over mere life for its own sake’ (Benjamin 1978: 297; Agamben 1998: 65-66). His critique 
of modern political thought follows Benjamin’s both in terms of his diagnosis of the ever-
encroaching violence of law and in his articulation of a possible alternative conception of 
politics, beyond law and beyond historicism. Agamben's argument for the need for an 
opening into such a 'nonstatal and nonjuridical politics and human life' (Agamben 2000: 
112) draws on Benjamin's arguments about violence and history.5   
 The idea of ‘mere’ or ‘bare’ life is central to Agamben’s analysis of the 
subsumption of politics under violence in the contemporary world.  In the classical polis 
zoē (simple, natural life, shared by animals and humans) is excluded from the realm of 
politics proper, and is confined to the private realm of the household. It  is clearly 
distinguished from bios, ‘the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group’ 
(1998:1), which takes place in the public sphere. The classical polis depends on marking 
the distinctions between these two different realms of existence. In contrast, in the modern 
state, the realm of zoē becomes increasingly politicised and its distinction from bios 
disappears from view. Instead, politics becomes bio-politics, devoted to the production and 
preservation of natural life. The result of this is twofold.  On the one hand there is a 
proliferation of technologies through which individuals are produced as ‘docile bodies’. On 
the other hand, there is a massive increase in the power of the state to control all aspects of 
human existence.(Agamben 1998: 4-5)  
 In accounting for the nature of sovereign power, Agamben utilises two figures: the 
sovereign authority whose right to decide on the exception underpins law (Agamben 
1998:26) and homo sacer (Agamben 1998: 81-83). Homo sacer is the figure who, in 
Roman law, marks the boundary between political and natural life as a being that may not 
be sacrificed but may be killed. What is important about both of these figures is how both 
represent zones of indistinction between what lies inside and outside of the polis. The 
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sovereign power of exception is both law and not law; homo sacer is both included and 
excluded from both nature and politics, his life is ‘bare life’, not even the simple, natural 
life of zoē. There is a symmetrical relation between sovereignty and the bare life of homo 
sacer. (Agamben 1998:84)  This, Agamben argues, is fundamental to all sovereign power.  
Whatever the specific form taken by polis or state, all law is taken to depend on 
constitutive (lawmaking) violence. In the modern state, however, the moment of inclusive 
exclusion, which in the classical polis confirmed and protected the distinction between 
political and natural life through the production of bare life, has become more than a 
moment of exception. This is because the dependence of the exercise of sovereign power 
on its inclusive exclusion of life has shifted from the margin to the centre of politics.  
 This follows the growing importance, since the seventeenth century, of the needs 
and interests of whole populations to the perpetuation of state power.  This has been 
accompanied by the discourse of ‘rights of man’ that seeks to challenge but actually 
reinforces new biopolitical forms of sovereign power (Agamben 1998: 121).  Within the 
modern state, all citizens can be said ‘in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear 
virtually as homines sacri’ (Agamben 1998:111). In other words, the moment of exception, 
in which politics is constituted through sovereign exclusion of life, has become the 
predominant mode in which politics is conducted. It is for this reason that Agamben sees 
the camp as the ‘biopolitical paradigm of the modern’. The concentration camp and the 
refugee camp are both absolutely biopolitical spaces, that is to say that they are both 
wholly spaces of exception which operate in a zone of indistinction between politics and 
life, and mark the boundaries between inside and outside of political community 
(Agamben 1998:123; 134). The fact that the former is the product of totalitarian politics 
and ideology while the latter is the outcome of ‘humanitarianism’ does not matter. 
Although Agamben acknowledges differences between democratic and authoritarian states, 
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and between fascist and liberal ideologies, insofar as both make life central to politics, both 
reproduce the original constitutive violence of sovereignty (Agamben 1998:10-11). 
Biopolitics becomes the micro-management of individual lives and deaths in developments 
like the legalization of euthanasia. At all levels, biopolitics degenerates into 
‘thanatopolitics’ (Agamben 1998:122).  
 Drawing on Benjamin’s arguments about violence and history, Agamben identifies 
an alternative, geniune politics  in ‘the sphere of a pure mediality without end intended as 
the field of human action and human thought’ (Agamben 2000: 115-6).   The problem is 
how to find the way, the opening, to this other kind of politics.  In Letter to the Romans 
Paul writes about a time in which the end of both history and state power are immanent. It 
is this same kind of time, Agamben argues, that is at issue in Benjamin’s notion of 
‘messianic time’.6  For Agamben, it is by re-connecting with the experience of messianic 
time in both Paul and Benjamin that the opening into nonstatal and nonjuridical politics 
may become possible. (Agamben 2005b: 25) 
 Agamben tries to capture the meaning of the experience of this kind of time in 
terms of the modality of ‘exigency’. In unpacking this concept, he echoes Benjamin’s 
critique of victors’ history in Theses on the Philosophy of History.  Benjamin argues that 
the task of the historical materialist is to identify those moments in the past that call the 
present into question, and fuse with the present in a construction of history in which time 
comes to a standstill.(Benjamin 1999: Theses XVII, A, 254-5)  Agamben calls for us 
similarly to relate present to past.  For Agamben, this means an acknowledgement in the 
present of responsibility to the exigency of the ‘forgotten’, all of the moments that will 
never be remembered because they are not part of victors’ history.  This responsibility is 
not about writing alternative subaltern histories, but about recognising the dependence of 
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the present on the forgotten past, and therefore the existence of an ongoing claim of the 
past upon the present (Agamben 205b: 40-41).  
 Within messianic time, all things and all subjects are called into question 
(Agamben 2005b: 42). The redemption of what has been involves the undoing of the 
present in relation to the past, which means the undoing of the conditions that made the 
past possible. But if messianic time undoes all things and all subjects, it nevertheless does 
have a quasi-subject - the remnant. According to Paul, the remnant is what is saved, but the 
prophets, and Paul, address all the people - all shall be saved. (Agamben 2999: 162-3)  In 
his interpretation of Paul’s account of the body of the elect, Agamben argues that its 
defining characteristic is non-identity. He concludes this on the basis of Paul’s 
characterisation of the Christian as the non-coincidence of both Jews and non-Jews with 
themselves as Jews or non-Jews in terms of flesh and spirit (Agamben 2005b: 51; Romans 
ch 9 vv.4-8 check). Impossibility of identity is key to the meaning of ‘the people’ as a 
political actor. This should not be understood as it is in traditional democratic theory, as 
universality, majority or minority, but as the 'figure assumed in decisive moments'. 
(Agamben 2005b:57)  The politics of the remnant is unrepresentable; in this it is like 
Benjamin's divine violence.  It is captured principally in its radical difference from the 
violent politics of law and the state. 
 Paul’s exposition of messianic time as a ‘now’ time, in which the past is 
comprehensively undone, also begs the question of  the relation between this ‘now’ time 
and the law. Agamben claims that what is at stake in Paul's argument is not the setting of 
‘non-law’ against ‘law’ but rather ‘setting a non-normative figure of the law against the 
normative figure of the law’ (Agamben 2005b: 95; Romans ch 7 check). Agamben argues 
that Paul means not that traditional law is simply abolished, but that it is deactivated or 
suspended, yet simultaneously fulfilled in the law of faith. The messianic relation between 
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faith and law is one in which faith both deactivates and fulfils law. This conclusion leads 
Agamben back to his earlier analysis of sovereign power and the state of exception. 
(Agamben 2005b: 104, 106-7) 
 Paul’s radicalisation of the state of exception, by absolutizing the deactivation of 
the law of the commandments, according to Agamben, essentially exposes the illegitimacy 
of all legal powers in messianic time.  Agamben reads Paul through lenses provided by 
Benjamin, as exposing the unjustifiablity of sovereign power as such (Agamben 2005b: 
111; see also Benjamin Thesis VI).  Nevertheless, this does not mean that messianic time 
transcends law. Faith (religion) and commandment (politics) are not two ‘heterogeneous’ 
elements, but both are elements of law. The suspension of commandment (politics, law) as 
norm and the confession of faith have two different kinds of potential.  They might become 
the ground of normative law (resuming the dialectic between law-making and law-
preserving violence) or they are taken as instances of pure experience of the world (in 
which case the world is opened up as a 'space for gratuitousness and use'. (Agamben 
2005b: 1325)  Agamben suggests that we can interpret the history of both church and 
human society in terms of a ‘dialectic’ between these two tendencies. He also argues that it 
is always the case historically (‘and seems to be happening again today’) that the second 
tendency falls to the wayside, leaving only an atrophied normative law in the sovereign 
power of the state and in the dogma of the church (Agamben 2005b: 135). In response, 
there is only weak messianic power, the 'remnant of potentiality'. 
     
4. Derrida: Politics of the Lesser Violence  
 There is an element of messianism in Derrida's political thought.   But it is a 
messianism that is not about fulfilment, now or in the future, rather it is a messianism of 
temporal dislocation, haunting and promise. 
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It is a proper characteristic of the spectre, if there is any, that no one can be sure if 
by returning it testifies to a living past or to a living future, for the revenant may 
already mark the promised return of living being. Once again untimeliness and 
disadjustment of the contemporary. (Derrida 1994: 123) 
 
 In this section we begin by tracing the theme of violence generally in Derrida's 
philosophy, concentrating on papers in Writing and Difference (1978) and Of 
Grammatology (1976).   We then go on to his explicit interpretation and criticism of 
Benjamin in 'The Force of Law' (1992), and to his idea of the politics of the revenant in 
Spectres of Marx.7 
 Derrida argues that any use of language depends on a primary violence that 
obliterates ‘the proper’, in the sense of the singularity of any specific subject, object or act. 
For instance, in order to be meaningful within language, the uniqueness of what the proper 
name is intended to invoke is destroyed by its dependence on the previously established 
significance of particular letters and sounds, that in turn depend on a set of rules and 
relationships that reduce the unique to a common pattern of differentiation, and therefore 
always to something that we have heard before, a repetition. Even where there is no written 
form of language, the distinction between writing and language can only be sustained 
through a denial (itself violent) of the dependence of speech on writing.(For example, 
Derrida 1976: 120).  This highly formalised conception of violence identifies violence with 
the violation of the singular necessary to any common system of meaning, but also to the 
dissimulation of this violence in supposedly ‘scientific’, objective analyses of language and 
culture.8 
 In ‘The Violence of the Letter’ (in Derrida 1996), engaging with Levi-Strauss’s 
work, Derrida elaborates on the distinction and connection between three levels of violence 
which are bound up with the priority of writing over speech. The 'tertiary structure of 
violence' comprises, first,  originary (‘arche’) violence, which is the violence of the 
transformation of singularity into particularity in language (the priority of writing); second, 
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the ‘reparatory’ violence of law, which suppresses arch-violence, and formulates universal 
rules that make sense of particular claims and actions in relation to general truths, thereby 
regulating what is permissible and what isn’t within political communities; third and 
finally the violence of reflection, which constitutes the empirical possibility of the 
transgression of law (the second violence).9  The violence of reflection challenges the 
reparatory violence of law by revealing the arche-violence that law both requires and 
suppresses (Derrida 1976: 112-3).  
 Beyond structuralist linguistics and social anthropology, Derrida finds in Western 
metaphysics the same pattern of thinking that disguises its own violence. In the case of 
phenomenology (Husserl) and ontology (Heidegger), which set themselves against 
structuralist approaches, and claim to articulate the meaning of objects as they appear or 
disclose themselves, Derrida argues that, at bottom, both share the same violent structure in 
which difference is reduced to what he terms ‘the totalitarianism of the same’ (Derrida 
1978 fp 1964:113). Derrida’s critical engagement with Levinas is more sympathetic in that 
he reads Levinas as aiming to avoid the originary violence of subsumption in which 
Western metaphysics in general is caught. Nevertheless, Derrida ends up accusing Levinas 
of falling into the trap of ‘originary violence’ himself in failing to acknowledge the mutual 
implication of the ongoing violence of discourse and its supposedly non-violent condition 
of possibility in the ‘mute glance’ (Derrida 1978 fp 1964: 130). It appears, therefore, that 
we are caught, whether we like it or not, in an ‘economy of violence’, also referred to as 
‘economy of war’, (Derrida 1978 fp 1964: 185), in which each attempt to evade the 
violence of logos also always enacts it.( Derrida 1978 fp 1964:156)   
 What, then, do Derrida’s analyses of structuralism and metaphysics tell us about his 
understanding of violence in relation to politics? First, in relation to the meaning of 
violence itself, Derrida’s key claim is that violence is the forcible violation of singularity 
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(integral and unique), in which beings and actions are deprived of the singularity proper to 
them and transformed into particular instances of a general category or rule. This forcible 
violation of singularity is, according to Derrida, presupposed in all language and 
meaningful social and political practice, including politics. Second,  although Derrida’s 
concept of violence does not necessarily imply phenomenal violence, he clearly sees arche-
violence as fundamental to both the reparatory violence of law and the transgressive 
violence of reflection. Third, Derrida suggests that there is no possibility of breaking out of 
the tertiary structure of violence.  
 In his treatment of Levinas, however, Derrida suggests that it may be possible, once 
we have recognised, and ceased to dissimulate (disavow) the tertiary structure of violence 
in which we are caught, to discriminate between ‘worst’ (original) and ‘lesser’ (secondary) 
violence. (Derrida 1978 fp 1968: 162) Derrida’s critical engagement with Levinas 
prefigures his argument about law and his reading of Benjamin in “Force of Law: the 
mystical foundation of authority’. In this text, Derrida begins by asking, what is the 
difference between the force of law and ‘violence deemed unjust’? – and notes that Gewalt 
is the word used for both legitimate force and illegitimate violence in German. The 
discussion that follows sets out to problematise the distinction between legitimate force 
and unjust violence by locating violence both in law's institution or inauguration (which 
cannot itself be categorised as legal or illegal, just or unjust) and  in the moment of 
‘decision’ or ‘interpretation’ in which law is applied – ‘interpretive violence’ (Derrida 
1992: 13).  This  distinction is reminiscent of that between Benjamin’s lawmaking and 
law-preserving violence.  
 This location of violence in law echoes the argument about ‘originary’ violence in 
relation to language. Derrida’s claim is that the only way universal rules can be applied in 
the regulation of human conduct is through a prior violation of singularity, in order that all 
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actions can be interpreted as particular instances of a general category. This arche-violence 
is inherent in the constitution of law itself. It institutes exclusive divisions between those to 
whom distinctions between legitimate force and unjust violence apply and those to whom 
they do not. (Derrida 1992: 18)  Derrida points out that there are still many ‘subjects’ not 
counted as subjects who ‘receive this animal treatment’ in relation to the law.   
 Derrida’s argument suggests that the violence inherent in the ongoing operation of 
legality is always exceeded by an original violence that enables law but cannot be captured 
in its terms – an unintelligible, ‘mystical’ foundation of law. In addition, he claims that this 
original, unintelligible violence is also constantly repeated in the moment of adjudication 
in which the subsumption of a particular case under a category of law is decided by the 
judge. Ultimately, there is no law for law, which means that the legitimacy of law’s 
foundation cannot be judged determinately (in relation to universal principles). In the case 
of arguments that would ground positive law in natural law, Derrida argues, the same 
pattern is repeated, since natural law also requires the prior violence of the reduction of 
singularity to particularity – or of difference to sameness. 
 It is at this point in the argument that Derrida introduces the concept of ‘justice’ in 
contrast to law and makes a connection between justice, violence, deconstruction and law. 
In his initial discussion, the domain of law, once it is constituted, is one of rules and 
calculation.  Justice, on the other hand is ‘infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and 
foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic’ (Derrida 1992: 22). Whereas law is 
addressed to the particular as an instance of the general, justice, according to Derrida, is 
addressed to the singular – even when it is expressed in universal terms. The aspiration of 
justice is to do justice to singularity, to respect not ‘the’ person but ‘this’ person, not ‘the’ 
case’ but ‘this’ case, whether this is articulated in terms of ‘desert’ or ‘rights’. Thus far, 
Derrida suggests, his own argument resembles that of Levinas, who sees the meaning of 
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justice as bound up with the radically asymmetrical relation of obligation between self and 
other, rather than in relations based on equity and symmetry (Derrida  1992: 22). There are 
also clearly echoes of Benjamin in the distinction Derrida draws between justice and law. 
However, Derrida’s argument does not stop with the contrast between justice and law.  
Law claims to exercise itself in the name of justice, and justice is required to establish 
itself in the name of enforceable law. (Derrida 1992: 22) 
 The interrelation between law and justice sets up a series of problems for both. 
Justice (addressed to singularity) is, literally, what is suppressed by law, not contingently 
but as a necessary aspect of what law is.  Yet the only way of delivering justice is through 
the medium of law. At the same time, the orientation of justice to singularity is also the 
possibility of the deconstruction of law.  So it is ambiguously related to the violence that 
grounds law. Justice deconstructs law because it puts both the foundation (‘the institutive 
act of a constitution that establishes what one calls in French l’etat de droit’) (Derrida 
1992: 24) and interpretation (the judge’s decision) of law into question, pointing to the 
ways in which law cannot account for itself in terms of law (Derrida 1992: 22-26). Justice 
in this sense disrupts any given ruling order by perpetually pointing us to the ways in 
which any application of law will fail to do justice to the uniqueness of every case.   
  Justice is ambiguously related to the violence that grounds law in two respects.  
First, because every grounding of law is a response to law’s failure to do justice within a 
given existing constitutional or juridical framework. This means that justice is always in 
danger of becoming violence in the form of a new originary institution of law. Second, 
because it is addressed to singularity and is therefore both unintelligible and impossible in 
the same way as is the extra-legal moment of foundation or decision through which law is 
constituted. It seems therefore as if justice is ‘terrifying’ in the same way as is the 
‘undecipherable’ event that originates (or ‘decision’ that perpetuates) legal order.  
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 Derrida’s analysis of the distinction and mutual implication of justice and law 
generates twin anxieties: first, about the potentially crippling effects on political 
engagement of an idea of justice beyond law and calculation; second, about how the idea 
of justice itself may be ‘reappropriated’ by violence.  (Derrida 1992: 28)  He introduces the 
concept of ‘politicization’, as the ongoing negotiation between the impossibility and 
danger involved in aspirations for justice and the violence inherent in law. This means the 
constant questioning of how and where law is instituted and applied both at the macro level 
(eg. international law) and in more (apparently) ‘secondary’ or ‘marginal’ areas. This is in 
order to challenge the ways in which calls for justice are being ‘posed and violently 
resolved, that is to say buried, dissimulated, repressed’ in the grounding and extension of 
law – but also to distinguish between lesser and ‘worst’ calculability and 
calculation.(Derrida 1992:28; 1994:25-6) In listing some of the ‘marginal’ areas for the 
politicisation of law, Derrida refers to a range of different issues, from regulation of the 
teaching and practice of languages, to the military use of scientific research, abortion, 
euthanasia, bio-engineering and animal rights (Derrida 1992: 29). But it is clear that what 
is at stake for Derrida is not the positing of justice (non-violence) against law (violence) 
but something much more like an attempt to judge between lesser and ‘worst’ violences – 
since justice cannot escape from law. In an attempt to follow through this claim of the 
ineradicability of violence in the relation between justice and law, Derrida turns to 
Benjamin’s essay ‘Critique of Violence’.   
 As has been observed, Derrida’s reading of Benjamin in ‘Force of Law’ is puzzling 
and contestable.10   In effect, he offers two readings of Benjamin’s text. The first is a 
detailed commentary that involves a lot of direct quotation from the text and raises certain 
critical questions (Derrida 1992: 29-57). The second is highly speculative and polemical 
(Derrida 1992: 57-63). Given the care with which Derrida approaches texts, it is worth 
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looking carefully at this juxtaposition. In his first reading of Benjamin’s text, Derrida is 
preoccupied by the ways in which Benjamin’s binary oppositions, between law-making 
and law-preserving violence, and between mythic and divine violence, are unstable and 
tend to collapse into, contaminate, or be haunted by, one another (Derrida 1992: 44; 55).  
 Derrida points to the way that the relation between law-making and law-preserving 
violence in Benjamin’s account is a self-destructive cycle, in which in order to conserve 
itself as law, law must perpetually repress the mythical, law constituting violence of its 
origins, and thus makes itself vulnerable to new law-making challenges.   In this sense, the 
nature of law-making and law-preserving violence is indeterminate or undecidable, 
constantly open to change, decay and renewal. At the same time, Derrida points out how 
the identification of ‘pure’ or ’divine’ violence is impossible to decide upon, given 
Benjamin’s own acknowledgement that such violence is humanly unknowable, other than 
(indirectly) in retrospect (Derrida 1992: 55-6). 
 His first reading of Benjamin’s text reaffirms the argument Derrida makes earlier in 
the essay in which the relations between law and justice, between law and violence, and 
between justice and violence is explored. For Derrida there is no pure ‘outside’ of law, 
whether understood as pure justice or pure violence, there is therefore no escape from law 
and the ways in which it is haunted by both justice and violence. This is something he 
takes to be demonstrated by Benjamin’s own argument, but to be insufficiently 
acknowledged by Benjamin himself. Where Benjamin appears to keep Jew (divine 
violence) and Greek (mythical violence) distinct, in contrast 
deconstructive discourses as they present themselves in their irreducible plurality 
participate in an impure, contaminating, negotiated, bastard and violent way in all 
these filiations – let's call them Judeo-Greek to save time – of decision and the 
undecideable’ (Derrida 1992: 56). 
  
Having said this, Derrida goes on to note that Benjamin himself just before the end of the 
text, refers to mythical violence as ‘bastardized’ divine violence, thus demonstrating again 
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how the terms that Benjamin introduces as separate become mutually contaminating. 
(Benjamin 1978: 300)   
 Nevertheless, Derrida’s first reading of Benjamin concludes by suggesting that 
Benjamin’s final remarks in the text reinforce the idea of the separation of mythical and 
divine, law and justice in their unequivocal condemnation of the former and celebration of 
the latter. These final sentences of Benjamin’s text set up Derrida’s second reading of 
Benjamin, which rather than being a close textual analysis, presents itself as an attempt to 
interpret ‘the problematic and interpretive space in which his discourse on the final 
solution might have been inscribed’ (Derrida 1992: 58). Here Derrida works through a 
variety of responses to the holocaust that could follow from Benjamin’s work. In doing so, 
he emphasises those aspects of Benjamin’s argument that are anti-liberal, anti-humanist 
and anti-enlightenment. The reading culminates with the claim that the interpretive space 
opened up by Benjamin’s text leaves open the temptation to ‘think the holocaust as an 
uninterpretable manifestation of divine violence’. (Derrida 1992: 62)  
 In contrast to the earlier detailed textual analysis, it seems here that Derrida has 
moved far from Benjamin’s writings, his political context and anti-fascist engagement.  
Derrida is serious in his interpretation.  This is evidenced by the long footnote to the 'Force 
of Law' which comprised an introduction to the second part of the essay when it was 
delivered as a lecture. (Derrida 1992, editors note: 63-66)  What can only be interpreted as 
the violence of Derrida’s reading is clearly generated by two anxieties.11 These are, first, 
the potentially crippling effects on political action of the recognition of the contamination 
of justice by violence; and second, the fear (he uses the word ‘terrified’) of how the idea of 
justice as the incalculable other may be reappropriated by the worst violence (represented 
here by the final solution). In his closing comments, Derrida remarks that Benjamin’s 
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‘Critique of Violence’ ‘is still too Heideggerian, too messianico-marxist or archeo-
eschatological for me’ (Derrida 1992: 62). 
   
 
5. Conclusion 
 The burden of this paper is that Agamben and Derrida both consider seriously the 
question of the relationship between politics and violence and, in particular, have at the 
forefront of their thinking the question whether there can be politics that escapes, or 
overcomes, violence.  In different ways they argue that  non-violent politics is possible.  
However, this is an elusive, even a vanishing, possibility.  They both see a deep connection 
between modern sovereign power, deterministic philosophies that posit an end to history 
(whether that is progressive or apocalyptic), and effectively inescapable violence.  We here 
want to focus on some problems and difficulties that we identify in their respective 
positions.  These issues connect to the questions of normativity, and of political resistance.   
 For Agamben, messianic time is counterposed to normativity, as well as to law.  
However, this counterposition is simultaneously problematised - because normativity itself 
depends on messianic power and its sheer openness. In State of Exception, Agamben 
examines the idea of the ‘dialectic’ between normative and non-normative tendencies 
within the history of the Western legal order. Here, though,  it is the blurring of the 
boundaries between law-making and law-preserving violence that shapes our current fate. 
When these 'coincide in a single person', and are bound together in a state of exception, the 
'juridical-political system transforms itself into a killing machine'. (Agamben 2005a: 86)  
 At various points he suggests the possibility of challenges to this pessimistic 
scenario. In Means Without End he refers to the ways in which spectacular democracies 
also produce ‘singularities’, those subversive movements and events that form a messianic 
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interruption of state representation (2000: 114-116). But the arguments he makes for the 
normative power of the non-normative are always caught up in the same paradox.  Either 
weak messianic power inaugurates a new regime of normativity, or it remains a ‘weak’ 
messianic capacity, impossible to predict or direct, and which perishes in its own 
accomplishment.(Agamben 2005a: 59).   
 The use of theological language by Agamben, and by Benjamin, undoubtedly has 
the effect of emphasising the absoluteness of the distinctions between 'politics as usual' 
which is irrevocably mired in the violence of law, and genuinely revolutionary politics, in 
which politics is both detached from the violence of the state, and from the subsumption of 
political action undermeans-end readings of history.  The messianic ‘other’ of law-making 
and law-preserving violence does not depend on belief in any other worldly order.  In spite 
of the theological terms in which both men write, for both the messianic moment is within 
history rather than beyond it. Nevertheless, this ‘other’ politics is described as ‘pure’ or 
‘divine’ and  is unrecognizable, because it cannot be framed within existing political terms.   
Agamben's analysis of modern sovereignty unequivocally identifies all politics and all 
violence with absolute domination, recalling Benjamin's account of mythical violence as 
'bloody power over mere life for its own sake'.(Benjamin 1978:297).  An alternative to this 
can only be invoked in the mode of impossibility.  The non-normative normativity of weak 
messianic power will always be co-opted back into the violence dialectic of law.  This 
account gives us no tools of discrimination: any  differences between humanitarian and 
genocidal effort, between liberal and fascist states, between abortion laws and holocaust, 
are erased.   
 Derrida's engagement with Benjamin, by contrast, testifies to his concern about any 
possible erasure of differences between liberalism and fascism.12 All politics is violent, on 
Derrida's account, but it is more or less violent to the extent that it avows or disavows its 
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own violence.  If it avows violence, an internal connection is made between law and 
justice, and between calculable and the incalculable.  In circumstances of disavowal, even 
where intentions are good, justice is subsumed under violence.  Any articulation of a 
definite prescription of what ought to be invites the reappropriation of justice by violence.    
 Derrida does not infer from this any need to refuse the contaminations of politics.   
Nevertheless, for him the violence of law is not absolute.  It depends on and incorporates 
the means of its own undoing in the form of our recognition of the paradoxical dependence 
on the reduction of singularity to particularity that makes it possible. Although acting on 
this recognition is always also to engage in violence once again, to the extent that this 
action is self-conscious about the ways in which it is implicated in the tertiary structure of 
violence then it can aspire to ‘lesser’ rather than ‘worst’ violence. When Derrida speaks of 
the necessity of political engagement in relation to law and regulation on topics from the 
teaching of languages to euthanasia, he is precisely calling for such engagement to be 
oriented towards lesser violence through an aspiration towards an unrealisable justice.  
Rather, it indicates the need to politicise, to call into question, all manifestations of 
sovereign power across all arenas of policy.  In this respect, Derrida's analysis of the 
relationship between violence and politics opens up possibilities of discrimination that are 
absent from Agamben's.   
 Nevertheless, Derrida's argument still poses problems.  In particular his highly 
formalised, abstract, conception of violence limits the capacity of his analysis to grapple 
with the 'worst' violence - identified in the 'Force of Law' with the 'bloodless' annihilation 
of millions in the gas chambers.  In his tertiary structure of violence, attention is repeatedly 
drawn to the institution and maintenance of law (the first two levels).  Very little attention 
is paid to practices of reflective violence, which are treated as conditioned by the first two 
levels.  Whenever Derrida comes to address empirical instances of reflective violence, as 
 24
in the case of that accompanying revolutionary change, he always takes the analysis back 
to law, or to the level of 'originary' violence.  Phenomenal violence, the violence that is 
part of diurnal politics, is treated as having no distinct presuppositions or implications, 
other than those inherent in the origin and perpetuation of the suppression of singularity.  
Normatively, phenomenal violence is given a lesser weight than the violences that 
underpin it.  
 This has two uncomfortable consequences.  First, this normative marginalisation of 
phenomenal violence, cuts out one way that Derrida's distinction between worst and lesser 
violence might be made intelligible.  Because he always returns to the formal description 
of what violence means, Derrida blocks avenues for discrimination between diverse legal 
and political arrangements.  There is, after all, much more in the way of social, 
psychological, economic, legal and political presuppositions underpinning the possibility 
of the worst violence of the gas chambers than the simple disavowal of its own violence 
(no matter how important that disavowal turns out to be).  Second and connected, violence 
as an institutionalised practice, a mode of being in the world, is ignored.  As a mode of 
being, violence encompasses not only perpetrators and victims, but also a whole range of 
concrete social, political and psychological conditions of possibility.  
 In particular, the  political theorists will wish to ask how we might conceptualise 
violence and politics in terms that neither affirm a necessary relationship between them, 
nor rely on the invocation of messianic time to break their relationship.  Responses to this 
question will involve the examination of the historicity and embodiment of forms of 
violence and their political effects.  The kind of scheme constructed by both Derrida and 
Agamben,  in which politics is either all violence, or consists in the fleeting moments of 
messianic possibility, renders such key questions effectively unaskable.  
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1  Author refs 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010.  
 
2  'Zur Kritik der Gewalt' Archiv fur Sozialwissenshaften und Sozialpolitik 47 (see Agamben 2005:52). 
 
3  'Completed in spring 1940, first published in Neue Rundschau 61, 3, 1950' (Editors note in 
Illuminations Hannah Arendt (ed) London, Pimlico, 1999 p.258). 
 
4  .Note that Il tempo che resta (the original title of this work, subtitle Un commento sulla Lettera ai 
Romani., published Torino, Bollati Boginghieri, 2000), might well be translated into English as 'remant of 
time'.  
 
5  Of course Benjamin is by no means the only source for Agamben's philosophical thought and the 
themes of state power, law, time and history, and genuine politics that we focus on in this paper also reflect 
engagement with Arendt, Foucault, Heidegger, Schmitt, Hegel, Primo Levi and numerous others.  In 
emphasising the links between Benjamin and Agamben (and  later Derrida) in this analysis we are engaging 
in a partial reading, but one that we consider is illuminating of Agamben's and Derrida's analyses of violence 
and politics, and one that by no means misrepresents Agamben's, and Derrida's, own concerns and 
understandings, for both of them directly engage with Benjamin and at length.  In particular, both engage 
with the way themes in Benjamin's work either prefigure or seem to be the result of critical dialogue with 
themes from Carl Schmitt.  On this specific matter see Agamben 2005:52-62, 1998:65-6;  Derrida 1992:29-
30, and the endnote at 63-66.   
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6   Indeed, Agamben suggests that Benjamin had Paul’s argument in mind when he wrote the text - he 
identifies Paul as the 'theological dwarf under the table' in Benjamin’s opening aphorism in Theses on the 
Philosophy of History. (Agemben 2005b:138; Benjamin 1999: Thesis I p.245). 
 
7  Our analysis here is confined to Derrida's concept of the 'revenant' and its relation to Agamben's 
concept of the remnant.  In another paper we explore other aspects of Derrida's analysis of politics and 
violence in greater detail: (Author ref forthcoming).   
 
8  Cf in this connection the distinction between violence as ‘force’ and violence as ‘violation’ in 
Buffachi (2005, 2007).   
 
9  We take the term 'tertiary structure of violence'  from Beardsworth (1996), who analyses  the three 
levels or forms of violence in Derrida (p.20); see also Corson 2001:870-872. 
 
10  For example, see McCormick 2001a esp pp.396, 410, 414.  
 
11  cf McCormick 2001: 407 for an interpretation of the 'violence' of Derrida's treatment of Benjamin. 
 
12  For both Derrida and Agamben their reading of Benjamin's developing theory of modern state 
power is highly coloured by their concern about the relationship between Benjamin's ideas and those of Carl 
Schmitt (Schmitt 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1996).  Derrida comments on 'affinities' between Benjamin's and 
Schmitt's themes (Derrida 1992: 66n;) and on a letter from Schmitt to Benjamin (Derrida 1992: 31) 
(McCormick remarks that Derrida's text might lead us to believe that Schmitt and Benjamin 'had been 
faithful pen pals'. (MacCormick 2001a:410).   Agamben spends several pages analysing the exact nature of 
Scmitt's response to Benjamin, and Benjamin's taking up (in Theses on the Philosophy of History) some of 
Schmitt's inferences. (Agamben 2005:52-64)   He is concerned to turn round the scandalous idea that 
Benjamin was interested in Schmitt, by demonstrating Schmitt's interest in Benjamin.  Agamben refers to 
Derrida's discernment of the 'dangerous equivocations' in Benjamin's text, acknowledging that the sketch of 
divine violence, which 'de-poses law', does indeed conduce to this reading; but he judges that Derrida's 
association of divine violence with the Nazi 'Final Solution' is a 'peculiar misunderstanding'.(Agamben 1998: 
64).   
